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Abstract
In primitive and civilized cultures alike, myth has served as a foundational
component of social structure and societal cultural self-image. For peoples with
limitation on their skills of scientific inquiry and/or detached social observation, myth
has served purposes ranging from explanation of the natural world to early visions of
civil justice and a moral ethos. Such application of myth has necessarily and
simultaneously provided adherents with the means of rationalizing the caprice and
harshness of the natural world, as well as giving a means of accepting, even a fatalism,
concerning injustice.
Accordingly, as evidence of primitive and ancient informs us of the cultural
antecedents of much of modern civil justice, so to myth not only provides great
storytelling, but also insights into the moral and ethical aspirations of prior cultures, as
well as the socio-psychological means of man’s adaptation to frustration thereof.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
Myths have been born, adopted, adapted and passed on for perhaps 10,000 years

of man’s recollectable past.1 Their personages have dwelled in the sky in manlike form
with fantastic powers; in the sea as serpents or other fantastical creatures; in the bowels
of the earth as keepers of, alternatively, the afterlife, Hell, or both; and on the land as
benign or malign, corporeal or incorporeal, actors.
From prehistoric time onward, social groups have sought belief systems about
which they could model community behavior. More specifically, the mind of primitive
and ancient man turned2 to themes, stories and myths that seemed to be realistic
explanations of, or rationalizations of, the external world. As it happens, primitive man,
1

Epic poems, in contrast, have, by one estimate, been dated only so far back at 4,000 years. ROBERT E.
ANDERSON, THE STORY OF EXTINCT CIVILIZATIONS OF THE EAST 47 (George Newnes, Ltd. 1898).
2
For the purposes of this article, I will use “primitive man” to mean preliterate human social groupings.
“Ancient man”, in turn, is used to describe ancient literate societies, such as the ancient Egyptians or
Greeks.
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and to a lesser extent ancient man, could not readily distinguish between his life or being
and the forces of the external world. Without this latter and fairly modern capacity,
man’s interpretations of the forces of nature, as well as the behavior of other humans or
human collectives, were likely to be projections of his own wishes, fears and experience.
When rain would fall beneficially, the sun would shine seasonally, combatant groups or
cultures would not interrupt the safety and progress of the group, and justice and fairness
governed man’s activities with others, these stories would explain these phenomena as
consistent with the will of nature and nature’s gods. When, alternatively, the rain caused
floods, the crops failed due to an erratic climate, war or internecine conflict interrupted
the ordinary patterns of life, or injustice was dealt, man’s myths would assign the reason
to will of a malevolent, a capricious, or a displeased natural force and its gods. The
forceful psychological projection afoot in the adoption of these myths is revealed in the
fact that a very large proportion of them involve powerful presences in human form.
Mythologist Thomas Bulfinch suggests in the Preface to his influential
BULFINCH’S MYTHOLOGY that two core values to the study of mythology, and in
Bulfinch’s case, Greek mythology, are that (1) familiarity with this body of literature
gives the reader access to tales, metaphors, similes and references that pervade educated
discourse; and (2) the literature it self is simply a marvelous read.3 But Bulfinch assigns
much too modest a role for mythology in today’s world. The reason is that myths, as first
envisioned, were a very sincere evocation of how man interpreted himself and the outside
world, and that such interpretation included not only an understanding of man vis a vis
the natural world but also a particular society’s cultural self image, from matters
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ceremonial to substantive.4 And as would be inevitable, a body of myth among primitive
man and ancient man has always been devoted to concepts of morality, ethics, right and
wrong. In other words, myth has included many of the initiating stories of the rewards of
the just life, the penalties that follow the unjust life, and the expectation that the just
result will not always be reached (herein of rationalization).
Because myth flowed from early and ancient man’s yet unborn capacity to imagine
himself as an agent operating independently of nature or indeed of others, it follows that
in its identification cultural goals, norms and strictures, myth antedates any law or norm
of any society. This is so because to cause a law or a norm to be in effect, man would
have to have developed the capacity to imagine himself as distinct from others in his
hereditary group, from his possessions, and from his personal or individual prerogatives.
Thus in any culture’s mythmaking era, its members were, by definition, not yet capable
of creating law, and this is true whether the law or norm was written, unwritten (and
therefore oral), or customary. This is not to say that a culture’s commitment to a structure
of myths precluded its later adoption of norms or law, as in the case of the ancient
Greeks, but rather only that it’s the former period preceded the latter.
Seen in this way, for each affected social group primitive and ancient myth
constituted an original and synthetic revelation of social order. Also, three features
would characterize myths pertaining not to natural phenomena but rather to man’s
relation inter se to others. First, such myths or fables either explicitly or implicitly
revealed norms and expectations that influenced individual or group behavior. Second,
the instruction of these myths would vary in no significant way from the such norms,
customs and laws as might in time follow. Third, these myths would enjoy great
4
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similarity in their identification of normative values consistent with the healthy growth
and prosperity of the respective primitive and ancient group. As such, as taken from
populations from seven of the eight continents, these fables provide stories of
tribulations, rewards, achievement and failure that are a roadmap leading in time to
numerous precepts of modern justice, perhaps most centrally self-discipline, forebearance
and fairness.
A dominant but not exclusive tenet of myth is that its story was at first thought
real, and only later would become, among certain quarters, thought fantastic. In modern
times, it might be unlikely that young persons would be told of Zeus, Athena or any part
of classical mythology with the purpose or expectation that either the teller or the
audience would take the story as anything but fantastic. Yet in our post-modern age
numerous myths play roles very similar to those played by ancient myths. Several
modern tales that may be termed myths may always have been thought fantastic, and yet,
while tempered with this modern insight, the role they have played in a society’s concept
of itself is still forceful. Among such modern myths (or sagas or fables) are included the
stories of Tom Sawyer and Huck Finn, Horatio Alger, Paul Bunyan, and even Spiderman.
For present purposes, though, this article will confine itself to the legends of antiquity.
A central feature of mythical and totemic adherence is “mediation of nature and
culture[.]”5 The article to follow will explore myth’s two primary roles in primitive and
in ancient society. One role has been the assignment of reasons for environmental
uncertainty, be it benign or ruinous, i.e., sun, rain, drought, plentiful game, etc. The
second role has been the mediation, often strongly normative, between conflicting
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perceptions of the external world, i.e., generosity and honesty are to be rewarded,6 save in
certain and unpredictable circumstances when they will not. As to the mediation,
therefore, of particular interest will be myths that directly or inferentially, and draw upon
this rich store for selected demonstrations of how myth provided early and ancient man
his sense of social cohesion, and social order.

II.

MYTH, SOCIAL ORDERING, AND TORT LAW
Webster’s’ Third New International Dictionary provides this definition of myth:

“a story that is usually of unknown origin and at least partially traditional, that ostensibly
relates historical events of such character as to serve to explain some practice, belief,
institution, or natural phenomenon[.]”7 The definition continues by assigning a principal
signification of myth to its role in sacred rites. However, as will be seen, the reach of
myths as stories the guidance and uncritical acceptance of which affects a culture is not
confined to a group’s sacred rites.
There are several telling aspects to this definition. First, the story is usually of
unknown origin, which is ordinarily true inasmuch as myths did not spring from the art of
individual sooths or visionaries, but rather collective creativity that certainly spanned
generations as the story underwent adaptation to render myth as intelligible to the task as
possible. That myths “ostensibly relat[e] historical events” is seen in the form and
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Among primitive peoples, such hospitality (or generosity) would ensure that all in the community,
including infants not yet able to contribute to any communal work, would be provided for adequately:
[F]or example, the [primitive] Australian hunter who kills a wild animal is expected to give one
certain part of it to his elder brother, other parts to his younger brother and still other parts of the
animal to defined relatives. He does this knowing that [the other brothers] will make a
corresponding distribution of meat to him.
Robert Redfield, Maine’s Ancient Law in the Light of Primitive Societies, in J.C. SMITH AND DAVID N.
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content characteristic of myths. They entail a story that may begin so simply as a boy
walking in a glade, or a god betrayed by a member of his court, but the portrayal (that
will seem fantastic to the modern reader) was subjectively thought to be true in its time.
Finally, myths serve to explain or rationalize something. As to the natural world, a myth
may explain the origin of thunder, or turning of the seasons, or the behavior of game
animals. Or it may explain the origins of the practice of hospitality between and among
primitive peoples,8 or why telling the truth is commendable, but not necessarily gainful.
It has been claimed that mythology and theology are “fundamentally alike” in
“philosophic conception and point of view” in that “[b]oth are supernaturalistic
interpretations of the world and of human experience. In theology, as in myths of
primitive peoples, we find the same kinds of stories of gods, demons and heroes[.]”9 I
will for the most part avoid discussing religion or sacred texts I will not treat herein
sacred religious themes as either myth or as fact, although I have given brief treatment
elsewhere to representative examples of harmony between Judeo-Christian writings and
the subsequent law of torts.10 Conceptually civil defalcations (most frequently torts) have
been distinguished from sins by the test that sins are offences against God (or deities
more broadly), while torts are offenses against one’s neighbor.11 It is necessary to pause
briefly, though, to note that that this distinction between legal proscription and sin is
often indistinct, and that sacred texts have with frequency assigned to religious figures
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(2005)(forthcoming). It remains nonetheless an irresistible
attraction to point out that the Judeo-Christian depiction of creation set forth in Genesis enjoys, to all but
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the role of law giver. Curiously, although Hoebel suggested that among primitive groups,
it would be rare for the twain between religious strictures and private delict to meet,12 he
also described the Ashanti as a “par excellence” example of “law controlled by
religion.”13 By way of a better known example, the anonymous author of Deuteronomy,
the fifth book of the Pentateuch and also of the Christian First Covenant (or Old
Testament) places Moses at the foot of Mt. Sinai and records the Hebrew leader as the
first interlocutor of God’s law.
A culture’s matured mythological philosophy informs them in every quarter of
their existence, including it’s goals and the control of group or individual behavior,
morality, the integration into and the uniformity of social processes, and indeed the social
groups very way of life.14 The sum total of any peoples’ beliefs is its philosophy, and its
philosophy may be naturalistic or super-naturalistic, which is to say, mythical.15 A
people postulating a spiritual reason for natural phenomena impose (or “project”) their
logic of observation upon the natural world without distinguishing their existence in an
external world independent of themselves. Thus, writes Leslie A. White, “while we
recognize a significant naturalistic composition in the philosophies of primitive peoples,
their over-all complexion appears to be predominately super-naturalistic- mythological-in
character.”16
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E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL DYNAMICS 259
(1954)(1976 ed .):
[I] believe that a review of the evidence will show that primitive criminal law coincides with
certain notions of sin with remarkable frequency, albeit not exclusively. Private law, which
predominates among primitives, rarely if ever undertakes to add its sanctions to tabu [taboo].
13
Id. at 264.
14
Cf., LESLIE A. WHITE, supra note 10 at 263-64.
15
Id. at 261.
16
Id. at 262.
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I have opened this discussion by proposing that myth has operated in two
principal ways: First to assign reasons for the activities of nature, which would be
otherwise incomprehensible to ancient man, and second to mediate normatively between
conflicting perceptions of the human or group behavior, which again be
incomprehensible without explanation or rationalization.17 Of particular relevance to
this latter role of myth, even without a society’s means of enforcement, myth, as is true
also of norms and customs, can be seen to represent deontic logic, or the “logic of
imperatives”18, which is to say, the myth identifies “necessary relations . . . of opposition
and concomitancy.”19 Choosing here for example only the concepts as they might be
expressed in the law of torts, a particular myth or fable might provide a society with a
means of distinguishing “acting from duty” from “delict”.
It has been It is accepted generally that ancient myths were born and not made,
which is to say, primitive or ancient did not as a matter of course objectify a certain or a
sequence of external event(s), be they natural or cultural, and the proceed consciously to
construct a mythic structure responsive thereto. Rather, as generally indisposed to or
incapable of disassociating the external world from himself, primitive man projected his
own and binary mental faculties upon the natural world, imposing mythological
explanations for events that without such projection would be inexplicable
As to both mediating roles (natural and social) governing conflicts between
expectation and phenomenon, it is accepted generally that ancient myths were born and
17

Cf. FITZPATRICK, supra note 4 at 16, in which Professor FitzpatricK, in describing the practical effect of
the sacred-mythological text of Genesis, writes: “Such mediations transcend what would otherwise be the
insuperable limits and contradictions of the profane world.”
18
See generally VON WRIGHT, NORMS AND ACTION (discussed in M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD’S
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE (7TH ed.) 205 & n. 36 (Sweet & Maxwell 2001).
19
P. RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 97 (1970)(referenced in M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD’S
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE (7TH ed.) 205& n. 35 (Sweet & Maxwell 2001).
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not made. This is to say that primitive or ancient man did not as a matter of course
objectify a certain or a sequence of external event(s) and consciously construct a mythic
structure responsive thereto. Rather, as generally indisposed to or incapable of
disassociating the external world from himself, primitive man projected his own and
binary mental faculties upon the natural world, imposing mythological explanations for
events that without such projection would be inexplicable. Thus myth will serve to
explain human interaction if the normatively optimal – or rational - conduct actually
occurred. Myth would also make comprehensible contrary or irrational conduct by
providing a rationalization for it, i.e., by describing a god who was generally good and
predictable but whom was sometimes given to capricious or erratic behavior.
The overarching significance of this mediating role of myth is further revealed in
the understanding of a very particular man’s psychological relationship with the external
world and with the actions of others: Man needs an explanation for things. As put by
Langer, “[M]an can adapt himself to anything his imagination can cope with; but he
cannot deal with chaos.”20 Myth is one means of avoiding such chaos, as it “provides a
`logical model by means of which the human mind can avoid unwelcome contradictions .
. . and so provides a means of `mediating’ between opposites that would, if unreconciled,
be intolerable.” 21 Primitive and ancient man’s adoption and perpetuation of
mythological stories and structures, therefore, reveals his “obsession with the real, his
thirst for being.”22
20

LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY 287 ( ), quoted in CLIFFORD GERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES 99-100 (1973).
21
MARK P.O MORFORD AND ROBERT J. LENARDON, CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY (3d ed.) 10 (1985)(internal
reference omitted).
22
M. ELIADE, MYTHS, DRAMS AND MYSTERIES; THE RELATION BETWEEN CONTEMPORARY FAITHS AND
ANCIENT REALITY 11 (Glasgow:Collins 1968). See comment on the relation between myth and man’s
existential realization, below at note ___ and accompanying text.
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In the analytical structure of Claude Levi-Strauss, human societies throughout the
world have evidenced certain “unchanging patterns” and “consistent structure[s]”. Myths
“are part of the working of this social structure and are derived ultimately from the
structure of the mind.”23 The binary structure of the human mind, the reasoning goes, is
binary, e.g., life/death, hunter/hunted, just/unjust, and myth mediates between and
resolves such “conflicting opposites.”24 As suggested, such opposites might be natural,
such as life v. death, light v. dark, feast v. famine. Or of greater interest for present
purposes, the opposites might be truth v. falsehood, or justice v. injustice, which is to say,
opposites that confront man in his dealings with other individuals or social groups. Be the
myth’s instructive value natural or societal, it is labile and malleable, and may change in
time.25
A societal belief in a myth or in a norm derived therefrom need not have the
force of law in order to effectively regulate or at least affect behavior. Indeed, some
norms have seemingly controlled social activity even more effectively that had or might
law on the same or similar themes. Characterized sometimes as “ruling ideas”, myth’s
“exemplary” ideas “dra[w] a distinction between society and that which lies below it, in
an underworld of seedy chaos[.]26 In this latter role, even without a society’s means of
enforcement, myth, as is true also of norms and customs, can be seen to represent deontic
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MARK P.O MORFORD AND ROBERT J. LENARDON, CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY (3d ed.) 7-8
(1985)(synopsizing the work of Levi-Strauss).
24
MARK P.O MORFORD AND ROBERT J. LENARDON, CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY (3d ed.) at 8
(1985)(synopsizing the work of Levi-Strauss).
25
Cf. FITZPATRICK, supra note 4 at 26 (citations omitted).
26
J. B. Thompson, Introduction to C. LEFORT, THE POLITICAL FORMS OF MODERN SOCIETY:
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note 4 at 37, 38.
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logic, or the “logic of imperatives”27, which is to say, the myth identifies “necessary
relations . . . of opposition and concomitancy.”28 Understood as such, myth is not simple
“the preserve of story tellers and performers of ritual,” but rather and more importantly
“an accessible and regular mode of being in the world, as a mode of making the deepest
truths of life generally operative[.]”29
Myth has always been imparted by two means: language and symbol, which is to
say, myths would ordinarily be conveyed by symbolic or oral story telling.
Mythological thought “builds structured sets by means of a structured set, namely,
language.”30 Regarding oral story telling, evaluation of the societal role of myth cannot
be complete without reference to its primary means of transmission: the oral tradition.
As defined and explained by anthropologist A. Raphaël Ndiaye: “There are multiple
suitable definitions of oral tradition; despite numerous nuances, it represents the complete
information deemed essential, retained and codified by a society, primarily in oral form,
in order to facilitate its memorization and ensure its dissemination to present and future
generations.”31 “Oral tradition,” Ndiaye continues, “appears then as a heritage which
displays the many dimensions of humanity, including reason, intelligence and spirituality;
a willingness to live on, allowing Claude Lévi-Strauss in particular to affirm that there
are no children among people-all are adults.”32 In preliterate societies, while deference
was owed great men and village elders (or in matriarchal societies, their female
27

See generally VON WRIGHT, NORMS AND ACTION (discussed in M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD’S
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE (7TH ed.) 205 & n. 36 (Sweet & Maxwell 2001).
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J. RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 97 (1970)(referenced in M.D.A. FREEMAN, id. at 205& n.
35.
29
FITZPATRICK, supra note 4 at 22, referencing P. Davidson, .Bookmark: The Storyteller, BBC 2
Television, 7 March 1990.
30
CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, supra note 5 at id.
31
A. Raphaël Ndiaye, Dakar Oral tradition: From collection to digitization, 65TH IFLA COUNCIL AND
GENERAL CONFERENCE 7 (Bangkok, Thailand) (June, July 1999).
32
Id.
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equivalents), decisions were arrived at communally, or horizontally. Ndiaye continues:
“Within such societies, oral tradition guarantees its own reproduction by spreading in two
directions, vertically and horizontally: vertically from the elders and the past to the
present; horizontally, in a synchronous process between members of the contemporary
society.33 And essential to the nurturance of the governing myth from one generation to
another, although the roles of children and their duties of obedience might distinguish
them from adults, would differ, children were as infused with a recognition of their
participation in the collective on an equivalence with adults. The oral transmission of
myth thus reinforced the horizontal aspects of primitive societies, including their
horizontal decision making and law giving.
To some, the adoption of mythical perpetuation of such stories betrays the
limitations of the human minds of prior cultures to appreciate and interpret their worlds,
or more specifically that a culture’s mythic ideation is a function of primitive or ancient
man’s incapacity to analyze reality. Claude Levi-Strauss, C. Leach and others, however,
have rebuffed attribution of myths and rites to a proto-analytical “myth-making faculty”,
in which mankind “turn[s] its back on reality.”34 Instead, to Levi-Strauss, Leach and
other social scientists, a culture’s myths are the fruits of a methodology that, taking into
account the limitations of natural science available to any given era, stands on an
equivalence in its creation of natural and social truths generated by many later societies.
That primitive man’s exploration and explanation of the natural world would predate the
development of modern natural science, Levi-Strauss suggests, it is not for this reason

33

Id. at 8.
CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, supra note 5 at 16. See also C. LEACH, GENESIS AS MYTH AND OTHER ESSAYS
85 (Jonathan Cape 1969)(“[T]he anthropologist’s belief in the ignorance of his [primitive] contemporaries
shows astonishing resilience in the face of adverse evidence.”).i.
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“less scientific,” nor are its postulates “less genuine.”35 Or as explained by Clifford
Geertz, there is reason to disagree that man’s mental disposition was essentially fixed
prior to the development of culture, and that his current rational capabilities are merely
extensions thereof.36 To these social scientists, “[t]ools, hunting, family organization,
and later, art, religion, and `science’ molded man somatically; and they are, therefore,
necessary not merely to his survival but to his existential realization.”37
To these social scientists, the “principal value” of its myths has been “to preserve
until the present time the remains of methods of observation and reflection which were
(and no doubt still are) precisely adapted to discoveries of a certain type: those which
nature authorized from the starting point of a speculative organization and exploitation of
the sensible world in sensible terms.”38 Thus to Malinowski, far from the product of
unsophisticated and credulous minds, myths have typically represented “a hand-worked
active force[,] . . . a pragmatic charter.”39
In the end, it is probably most circumspect to assign both scientific and
nonscientific attributes to myth. As Levi-Strauss concedes: “Mythical thought for its part
is imprisoned in the events of which it never tires of ordering and reordering in its search
to find them a meaning. But it also acts as a liberator by its protest against the idea that
anything can be meaningless with which science at first resigned itself to a

35

Id.
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 82 (Basic Books 1973).
37
Id. at 83.
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Id.
39
B. MALINOWSKI, MAGIC, SCIENCE AND RELIGION AND OTHER ESSAYS 101 (Garden City:Doubleday
1954).
36
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compromise.”40 Any examination of myth, therefore, reveals myth and corresponding
phenomenon in a dialectic minuet.41
All myths relate (tell or show) a story. The form of the myth’s conveyance may
that of be story, dance, song; the myth may employ symbol, totem, or, almost invariably,
ritual. The choice and manner of utilizing such forms can affect greatly the power of the
message and even the message itself. Whatever the form chosen, a myth’s ritual,
symbolism, totemism or otherwise “function[s] to synthesize a people’s ethos – the tone,
character and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood – and their
world view – the picture they have of the way things in sheer actuality are, their most
comprehensible order.”42 Accordingly, the relation between law, be it ancient or modern,
and the myths of antiquity is best understood when one evaluates not only the content of
the story but also its form of portrayal. The dress of the participants might provide a
subtext, as in the example of the Navajo elders to represent the myth of their original
people by garb recollecting the original animals chosen to guide them.43 They might
involve ceremony, or dance, or the erection of totems or even buildings.44
With ceremonial representation, story-telling and accompanying ritual represent a
sum that is greater than its parts in terms both of believability and indelibility, a

40

CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, supra note 5 at 22.
Id. at 230-31.
42
GEERTZ, note 34 at 89.
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I.e, the silvery white coat of Wolf, the blue-feathered coat of Bluebird, the yellow-furred coat of
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and
accompanying text.
A remarkable feature of the religion of the Chaldeans has been used to explain the shape of their
palaces and temples. They `lifted their eyes to the hills’ on the north-east, `the Father of
countries,’ and imagined it the abode of the Gods, the future home of every great and good man. . .
.The type of the holy mountain was therefore reproduced in every palace and temple, sometimes
by building it on an artificial mound with trees and plants watered from above[.] . . .
ROBERT E. ANDERSON, supra note 1 at 34.
41
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phenomenon that is true to this day.45 It is no surprise that so many of today’s binding
“legal” actions are enveloped in ceremony –one need only consider the sacrament of
marriage. Indeed Scandanavian Realist Axel Hagerstrom sought to prove, successfully or
otherwise, that so prosaic as might be the oral exchanges of purchase and sale under the
Roman system of jus civile were part of “a system of rules for the acquisition and
exercise of supernatural powers[,].”46 and that the words and rituals had a “magical
effect.”47 And, as M.D.A. Freeman paraphrases Frederick Pollack, “ritual is to law as a
bottle is to liquor; you cannot drink the bottle, but equally you cannot cope with liquor
without the bottle.”48
Natural law, to Betrand Russell, “decides what actions would be ethically right,
and what wrong, in a community that had no government; and positive law ought to be,
as far as possible, persuaded and inspired by natural law.”49 The diplomacy that leads
away from analyzing religion qua religion as myth does not preclude taking note of the
frequent correlations diverse religions have made between natural law or natural rights as
individual cultures have visualized that will, and as they have believed in one or more

45

Of this phenomenon in modern popular culture, see Richard K. Sherwin, Law in Popular Culture 7, 8
(New York Law School Faculty Reprint Series No. 1 (2005):
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to communicate one meaning after another in quick succession. Such immediacy of
comprehension enhances persuasion.
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particular gods.50 This examination actually steps off of the diplomatic tightrope of
dissecting a particular faith in the expectation of determining what is fact and what is
fiction. This is true because while all faiths credit their sacred texts and stories as largely
factually, they are inclined to assess the beliefs of others as fantastic. Therefore it can be
said that at least from the perspective of a substantial minority of persons, the sacred
underpinnings of any faith other than there own is footed in myth or fantasy.
What does this approach, if credited, permit us to do? It lets us look at a
consistent pattern between and among faiths of assigning God’s will as responsible for, or
at least consistent with, natural law or natural rights.51 The basic structure of natural law
proposes that (1) the plan for man in society is the pursuit of what is good, just and
moral; (2) a perfect God is responsible for this plan, from which man deviates only at his
or its peril; and (3) there is an unbreakable teleological connection between God’s will
and natural law, which is to say, what is good, just and moral. If this much is true, then
the conclusion is inescapable that at the direction of diverse and heterogenous faiths,
another faith’s perception of goodness, justice and morality is based upon myth. This is
true even if the observing and the observed faith share essentially similar sacred
conclusions.
As suggested earlier, where and when myth has been believed, the fact that it has
not been law has not negated its role as a means of social control. Myth has long existed
in societies that simultaneously adhered independently to social norms, or even to written
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law,52 and examples abound in which the power of myth to regulate a society’s behavior
has equaled or exceeded the power of its laws. Os systematic significance along these
lines, the mythological trappings of equality among mortals does not mean that primitive
civil justice was immune to considerations of status or personage. For example, of Big
Men in the Plains Indian tradition, Hoebel writes: “By the very reason of their special
characters and social status the litigious behavior of such personages does not give a full
picture of law at large. Justice may wear a blindfold and every man be equal before the
law, but in every society – primitive and civilized- personality and social status color and
influence every legal situation.”53
In the next section I will visit representative a variety of mythical stories that
reveal the approach individual cultures have taken to rendering comprehensible the
second type of myth we have referred to throughout, that is to say, stories that pertain not
to man’s life in nature, but rather to man’s life in his culture. In each of these stories we
will see revealed a normative message as to optimal behavior within that society.
Without variation the stories are encomiums honest and industrious individual behavior,
and also to the preservation of a peaceful, just and prosperous community. At the same
time, in many of these myths the outcome is contrary to what the individual or the society
might fairly aspire to. When this happens, as often as not the result is attributable to the
acts of a capricious, willful or a displeased deity or spirit. As unfortunate as this result
may seem in absolute terms, it is by virtue of this latter type of story that primitive and
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ancient man could, when phenomena did not seem to align themselves intelligibly with
results, locate a rationalization therefore.

III.

PRIMITIVE AND ANCIENT MYTHO-DELICTUAL
PRECEPTS
That obedience is due to one’s elders is a foundational building block of many

myths, and there are important reasons for this. The primary one for out purposes is that
in primitive and ancient societies alike, a culture’s elders were the primary lawgivers,
using here “law” in its loosest of interpretations as including norm, custom or ruling idea.
Thus, for example, among ancient Egyptians examples remain of the teachings of familial
piety. According to one such literary fragment: “The son who obeys his father’s word
will thereafter live to a good old age.” The text continues with a forceful statement of the
liabilities that follow departure from this rule: “The disobedient son sees knowledge in
ignorance, virtue in vice; his life is what the wise man knows to be death, and curses
follow him as he walks in his ways.”54
The road to many delicts is paved with bad intentions, and thus it is no surprise
that primitive mythology contains variations on the most infamous story of the
introduction of intentional violence into the world. The story, of course, is that of Cain
and Abel, or the tale of the Good Twin and the Evil Twin.55 The intentional killing of a
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member of one’s own family, clan or tribe has always been considered the most horrific
of crimes. For example, in a Native American context, the killing of one Cheyenne by
another Cheyenne was “a stain on the tribal `soul,’”, revealing itself by a “`miraculous’ of
blood on the feathers of the [Medicine] Arrows[,]” one of two very important sacred
totems (or fetishes) of the Cheyene.56 Failure would dog the tribe’s hunters and war
parties. The perpetrator was thought – by Judeo-Christian analogue – to bear the mark of
Cain, his internal organs rotting with such a stench as itself to drive away the game.57
An Iroquois creation myth further develops the origins of the divide between good
and evil, again the in context of the Good Twin and the Evil Twin. In the story of its
early people, there existed and Upper World, inhabited by the Divine Sky People, the
Great Water, and the Great Darkness, comprising the world between the Great Water and
the Upper World. In the myth of The Woman Who Fell From the Sky, the great chief of
the Divine People had a daughter, Atahensic, who became gravely ill.58 A great corn tree
provided food to the people. It came to the chief in a dream that if he placed his daughter
at the base of the corn tree, and then dug the tree up by its roots, she would be made well.
He did so, but the only consequence was that the tree fell thunderously. A member of the
sky people, horrified to see their source of food jeopardized, threw the Atashensic into
the hole, and she fell into the water. To save her, the water animals formed a raft of their
bodies, but they eventually tired. These animals, Great Turtle, Muskrat, Beaver and
Otter, then attempted to each dive to the bottom of the water and to return to the surface
with earth. Only Muskrat succeeded, although he died in the effort, and Atashensic
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spread it about the edges of Great Turtle’s shell, more and more, until the shell became so
broad that it became Great Island, which wold be inhabited by Earth People. There
Atashensic dwelled, and eventually gave birth to a child, called Earth Woman. Some
time thereafter, Earth Woman became pregnant by the West Wind, and gave to Good
Twin and Evil Twin, although evil twin was so competitive that in desiring to be born
before Good Twin, he burst from Earth Mother’s side, killing her. As time passed, for
each beneficial act Good Twin sought for Great Island, Evil Twin would seek to sabotage
them. Evil Twin shrunk Good Twin’s fruit bearing Sycamore tree into a tree bearing
only shrunken and inedible pods, and used his evil imagination to create the great
mountains and the sharp rocks that hurt people’s feet. He made huge predators, such a
Bear, Wolf and Panther, and game animals so large that they could not be safely hunted,
but Good Twin made the predators smaller, and the game animals of such a size that they
cold be hunted by man. This was intolerable to Evil Twin, who sought to capture the
abundance of beneficial animals and hide them in a cave, closing the cave with a boulder.
Aware to this act, Good Twin pushed the boulder away, freeing the animals. Eventually
Evil Twin concluded the obvious, that he and Good Twin could not coexist. Evil Twin
proposed a fight. Good Twin, wishing to avoid violence, proposed a race. The Evil Twin
asked the Good Twin what might it be that could hurt hum, and the Good Twin answered
the wild rose; to the same question Evil Twin answered Buck’s thorns. Thus along the
proposed racing courses the Evil Twin placed the branches of the wild rose, taken from
the garden of his grandmother, Atashensic. From the forest the Good Twin gathered
Buck’s horns, and strew them along the Evil Twin’s side of the race path. The race
began, and is it progressed, whenever the Good Twin tired, he stopped, picked a wild
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rose, and ate it for renewed energy. The Evil Twin had nothing to refresh himself, and
was increasingly hobbled by the thorns in his feet. Upon his collapse, the Evil Twin
begged for mercy, but the Good Twin resolved to treat him as he would have been treated
had Evil Twin prevailed, and beat him to death with a branch of Buck’s thorns. The Evil
Twin’s spirit left to become the spirit of the dead, and became the Evil Spirit.59
A common mythic thread is that of evil being portrayed as a trickster. This is true
in the following Aztec myth of Quetzacoatl, and in the Norse myth of Balder
immediately thereafter. In the Aztec tradition we find the myth of Quetzacoatl, who in
fact may be a combination of fact and myth. In history he may have been Topilitzin (Our
Prince), who brought ethics and laws to the Toltec.60 In one version of the Quetzacoatl
myth, his counterpart, Tezcatlipoca, is not characterized as the Evil Twin of Quetzacoatl,
but for all intents and purposes he might as well be. Tezcatlipoca “represents all the evils
that test the moral fiber of human beings.”61 Fittingly, Tezcatlipoca is invisible and has
no corporeal presence. The themes of the principal Quetzacoatl/ Tezcatlipoca include the
tensions between temptation and forbearance, temperance and excess, and reason and
emotion. In this version, Tezcatlipoca holds mirror to Quetzacoatl’s face, and persuades
him that his image “is wrinkled like that of an ancient creature.”62 Tezcatlipoca
convinces the now insecure Quetzacoatl that he can regain his vitality and handsomeness
by adopting a ridiculous raiment of the feathers of the quetzal bird, a red and yellow
painted face, a feathered beard and a turquoise mask. He then urges Quetzacoatl to drink
an inebriating beverage, of which he, and then his followers, partake in excess. When he
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is again sober, Quetzacoatl realizes that among other immoral acts, he has committed
incest with his sister. Even though his ashamed, Quetzacoatl rationalizes temporarily that
he can, with his new wisdom of himself, yet lead his people. However, Tezcatlipoca
continues his evil work by visiting illness and privation upon the tribe of Quetzacoatl,
and ultimately Quetzacoatl leaves in a self-enforced exile and dies alone.
The Norse tale of Balder is representative of this genre. To the Norse, Balder, the
son of Odin and Frig, represented the epogee of purity and virtue.63 It was inevitable,
therefore, that evil, in the personage of Loki, would seek a way to imprison him.
Traveling the world, Balder’s mother sought and received a covenant from all living
things not to harm her son, save the little mistletoe bush, which she thought to young to
bring harm. In disguise, Loki interrogated Frigg, who conceded this omission.
Fashioning a mistletoe twig into a weapon, Loki joined a group engaged in a game in
which Frig’s success was tested by having the participants hurl objects at Balder, only to
find them bounce off harmlessly. By trick, Loki persuaded Hoder, Balder’s blind
brother, to take the mistetoe and throw it at Balder, and Balder was killed. With all of
the gods in shock, Frig bade Hermod the Bold to enter Niflheim, the kingdom of the
dead, to confer with Hel, Loki’s daughter, to seek conditions of Balder’s release. Hel
required proof that all creatures and forms in nature be weeping over Balder’s death.
Only one giantess refused, but it turned out that the giantess was Loki in disguise, and
Loki fled, and he fled for his life, taking the form of a fish. Thor, engaging in the search,
captured him. Loki was bound to three huge rocks by his slain son’s intestines, beneath a
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giant and venomous snake. When drops of the venom would touch Loki’s skin, he would
writhe in such pain that the mountains shook.64
The

horizontal/consensus approach to primitive decision making, be it for

defalcations or otherwise, has mythological antecedents. For example, the creation myth
of the Navajo tells of four gods appearing before the First People, who lived in the
Yellow World, and who, upon experiencing a shortage of food that imperiled their very
existence, dispatched messengers to the North, the South, the East and the West in search
of one who might lead them. From the West returned the Mountain Lion, who was
strong and wise; from the East the Wolf, as he was strong and clever; from the South, the
Bluebird, who was kind and wise; and from the North, the Hummingbird, who was wise
and just.65 For the virtues of each proposed leader the First People came to recognize that
to ensure peace, plentitude and justice, they needed the counsel and leadership of each
and all of the four. To this day, the legend continues, the Navajo are led by a council of
wise men representing each: Wolf wears a silvery white coat; Bluebird a blue feathered
coat; Mountain Lion a coat of yellow fur; and Hummingbird a coat of many colors.66
Aristotle’s role in advancing a concept of corrective justice is well known. In his
NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS Book V, ch. 2, “The Thinker” is credited with laying the
cornerstone of these principles as they underlay today's common law.67 Aristotle’s
understanding was that corrective justice would enable restoration to the victim of the
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status quo ante major, insofar as a monetary award or an injunction can do so.68 Under
the Aristotelian principle of diorthotikos, or "making straight," at the remedy phase the
court will attempt to equalize things by means of the penalty, taking away from the gain
of the wrongdoer." Whether the wrongdoer’s gain is monetary, or measured in property,
or the community’s valuation of a personal physical injury consequent to the defendant’s
wrongful act, by imposing a remedy approximating the actor’s wrongful appropriation
and “loss” to the sufferer, “the judge restores equality . . . .”69
Consistent therewith, there are close ties between the myth of early Greeks and
the more nuanced manner in which the society would eventually come to view restitution
as the preferable way to settle most civil harms. In THE ILIAD Book 2 we read the take of
the chariot race. Emulus, who was in actuality the fastest charioteer, comes in last, due to
the intervention of Athena. Achilles at first proposes to give Eumelus second prize, to
rectify the wrong done to him, leaving Diomedes, the actual first place winner, with his
first place prize. All are content save Antilochus, who had finished second in actuality,
and who proposes to Achilles that the order of finishing remain as it was in fact, and that
the compensation due Emulus be his award of a special prize as “the best man in the
race.”70 It is a result that in the finest Aristotelian logic “makes straight” a wrong, and in
not dislodging either Diomedes or Antilochus from their true order of finish, is probably
also Pareto Optimal.71
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Another Greek myth seeming instructs that if one is intent upon alienating the
affections of a woman, it is best that the woman not be the wife of Ulysses.72 In the tale
sometimes referred to as Penelope’s Web, Ulysses,73 king of Ithaca, is at first reluctant to
join the war against Troy, but does so at the insistence of his wife, the beautiful Penelope.
Ten years pass, Troy is in ruins, and the Greek warriors return, but there is no sign of
Ulysses. Even Laertes tells Penelope that Ulysses must have lost his life in a shipwreck.
Another ten yeas pass for the faithful Penelope, and as is inevitable, others seek the love
of Penelope, and ask that she choose from among them.. She resists, stating “Give me a
month longer to wait for him. In my loom I have a half-finished web of soft linen. I am
weaving it for the shroud of our father, Laertes, who is very old and cannot live much
longer. If Ulysses fails to return in the time this web is finished, then I will choose,
though unwillingly.”74 Penelope’s suitors took her at her word and more, taking lodging
in her palace and partaking of all of the attendant luxuries. Penelope, in turn, would
show them each day how her weaving was progressing, but at night she would unravel
what she had woven. Eventually, however, her ruse was found out, and her rude suitors
demanded that she make decision. Those gathered arranged once more for a feast, and it
was larger and more uproarious than those before. Scarcely noticed, an old beggar
entered the courtyard. He first approached Argos, Ulysses’ favorite hunting dog, who
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had grown old and toothless, and was mistreated by the interlopers. The beggar patted
the dog’s head, and whispered “Argus, old friend.” The dog stood, and then fell dead,
but with a look of satisfaction. The suitors noticed the beggar and ridiculed him, ordering
him out, but the beggar offered news of Ulysses, and Penelope bade that he stay and
receive refreshment. An old lady who had been Ulysses nurse washed his feet, but
sprang back in alarm upon noticing a scar upon the beggar’s knee, a scar that seemed
distantly familiar to her. The beggar whispered to her: “Dear nurse, you were ever
discreet and wise. You know me by the old scar I have carried on my knee since
boyhood. Well keep the secret, for I bide my time, until the hour of vengeance is nigh.”75
The suitors grew more demanding, and Penelope responded by pointing to a great bow
hanging on the wall, saying: “Chiefs and Princes, let us leave this decision to the Gods.
Behold, there hangs the great bow of Ulysses, which he alone was able to string. Let
each of you try his strength in bending it, and I will choose the one who can shoot an
arrow from it most skillfully.”
Each chief and prince tried his hand but each failed, until one said derisively:
“Perhaps the beggar would like to take part in this contest.” The beggar approached the
bow, and stood tall, revealing himself. Penelope cried Ulysses’ name. The suitor’s fled
in panic, but Ulysses with his bow and his arrows killed every one. Penelope returned to
Ulysses with the soft white cloth of her web, and declared: “This is the web, Ulysses. I
promised that on the day of its completion I would choose a husband, and I choose
you.”76
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If a principal instruction of the law of civil justice in any age is the avoidance of
bloodshed and the adoption of peaceable means of resolving discord, the story of
Penelope’ Web seems on its face to be the exception that test the rule. And perhaps this
is true, at least in the view of Michael Gagarin: It is inevitable that others have arrived at
a slightly different, but not conflicting, interpretation of the rights and prerogatives of the
parties to this eventual melee. This is the analysis of Michael Gagarin: “[T]he dispute
between Odysseus and the suitors seems to validate the rejection of a peaceful settlement
recitation in favor of self-help in order to receive one’s desired compensation. The
dispute itself stems from the conflicting set of rules guiding the behavior of both the
suitors and Penelpe in the ambiguous situation of Odysseus’s extremely long absence.
As legitimate suitors of a woman who has indicated that she will soon select one of them
to be her new husband, they have a right to be entertained in Odysseus’s home until she
makes this decision. In sever respects, however, their behavior in the house is clearly
improper, most of them obviously violate the norms of proper treatment of a beggar, and
their plans to kill Telemachus is a clear violation of several norms.”77
Even among subsistence societies there exist strong social strictures against killing, be it
by commission or omission, and as often as not these social norms are footed in myth.
For example, there has been much misunderstanding about the practices of the ancient
Inuit. Among the Inuit, claims of countenanced senilicide are both true and untrue.
There was widespread if not general acceptance that the aged individual could decide that
he or she could no longer contribute effectively to the collective, and ask that a family
member or friend end their life.78 However Iglulik myth reveals a social antipathy
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towards the involuntary killing of the elderly, generally provid[ing] [for] some
miraculous form of rescue . . . with a cruel and ignominious death for those who
abandoned them.”79 Among the Plains Indians, a proportion of the law was driven by
religion and other parts were not. For a killing, guilt was determined by the group’s
supernatural authority. Its punishment was in accord with its taboo or fetish against such
acts represented a “pollution” of a universal communal taboo, and the tribe would exile,
or “got shed”, of the individual so as not to be tainted by the deed.80
A lynchpin of all justice systems has been the elevation of truth over untruth.
Predictably, numerous primitive myths support the ethos of honesty. A myth of certain
Eastern Woodlands Indians fortifies a moral that truth is rewarded.81 It has sometimes
received the anglicized title of The Indian Cinderella. It begins on the shores of a bay,
where there lived a great warrior, who had once been among Glooskap’s (a Native
American mythic hero) helpers. This warrior, who was known as Strong Man, the
Invisible, had the power to make himself invisible, a skill he used to sneak among
enemies and learn of their plans. The warrior lived with his sister, who could see him
when others could not. Many maidens wished to wed this warrior, and as sisters are wont
to do, she helped him evaluate the candidates. In the early evening, she would walk to the
beach with any girl wishing to wed him. The warrior would approach in his invisible
form, and the sister would ask the suitor: “Do you see him?” The girl would invariably
respond falsely “Yes,” which one might think would dispose of the matter, but the sister
would indulge herself with further questions, such as “With what does he draw his sled?”,
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to which she would receive yet other fabricated replies.82 The village chief, a widower,
had three daughters. The youngest was beautiful, and for this reason the two older sisters
were jealous, dressed her in rags, cut her hair, and burned her face with coals, lying to
their father that their younger sister had done these things to herself. The two older
maidens naturally wanted to win the hand of Strong Wind, and like so many others, they
lied that they could see him, and went home disappointed. One day, the youngest
patched her tattered clothes and adorned herself in such modest ornaments as she had,
and went to visit Strong Wind’s sister. “Do you see him?” the sister asked, and the
young maiden answered “No.” Again she was asked: “Do you see him now?” This time
she answered: “Yes, and he is very wonderful.” “With what does he draw his sled?” The
maiden responded: “With the Rainbow.” “Of what is his bowstring?” She answered:
“His bowstring is the Milky Way.” It was now that Strong Wind’s sister knew that the
maiden had spoken the truth when she had said that she had seen him, as he had made
himself visible after her first truthful answer. The warrior’s sister took her to their home
and bathed her, and her scars disappeared, her hair grew long and beautiful, and she took
the wife’s seat next to her new husband. As for the cruel daughters, Strong Wind learned
of their acts and turned them into aspen trees. “To this day,” the story concludes, “the
leaves of the aspen have always trembled, and they shiver in fear at the approach of
Strong Wind, in matters not how softly he comes, for they are still mindful of his great
power and anger because of their lies and their cruelty to their sister long ago.83
From prehistory onward one pole star of man’s cultural evolution has been the
goal that one should treat another man as one would expected to be treated himself.
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Stated most famously by Jesus of Nazareth in what would become the vernacularized
“Golden Rule”, one African myth conveys masterfully both the concept and the operative
effect. In a folk tale entitled simply Gratitude84 from the Nupe of the Sudan, a hunter in
the bush kills and antelope. Boaji, a civet, asks the hunter for some of the meat, which
the hunter gives it. The following day, the hunter encounters an crocodile that is lost and
unable to find itsway back to the River Niger. The crocodile offers the hunter five loads
of fish if the hunter will show him the way, and the hunter agrees. He ties a thong around
the crocodile’s foot and leads him to the river’s edge. He loosens the thong to permit the
crocodile to make good on the bargain, but after bringing up several loads of fish the
crocodile snaps and the hunter’s foot and drags him under water. Presenting its catch to
his brother crocodiles, the hunter explains the circumstances and pleads “Is this fair?”
The crocodile relents, somewhat, and agrees to solicit the views of four others. The first
is a colored oval mat called an Asubi, floating down the river, and it recounts the
experience of Asubi at the hands of man, which is to say, man holds the Asubi in high
regards until it is old, at which time man discards it. The Asubi concludes that the
crocodile should be free to do with the man as it wishes. The next item consulted, also
floating down the river, is an old dress, that reaches the same conclusion as had the
Asubi. So too is the advice given by an old mare that has come to the river to drink.
Next the hunter and the crocodile meet Boaji, the civet
The civet replies that it cannot properly respond until it is able to understand the
entirety of the circumstances that led to the hunter’s plight. He has the hunter tie the
thong around the crocodile’s foot as it had been initially, and then to lead the group back
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into the bush to the place where the hunter had first encountered the crocodile. The civet
asked of the crocodile if it had been satisfied once it had been led by the foot to the water,
and the crocodile replied “No, I was not satisfied. Boaji said: “Good. You punished the
hunter for his bad treatment of you by grabbing his foot and dragging him to the
sandbank. So now the matter is in order. In order to avoid further quarrels of this kind
the hunter must unbind the thong and leave you in the bush.” The civet and hunter left,
leaving the crocodile lost, hungry and thirsty. The tale concludes: “There comes a time
for every man when he is treated as he has treated others.”85
Long before Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis staked claim to one of the
earliest expositions of a right to be left alone (or privacy),86 that right, and a particularly
harsh punishment for its violation, were described in a story Acteon, his hounds, and the
virgin goddess Diana. Thomas Bullfinch records the how the virgin goddess Diana
punished Acteon, the son of King Cadmus, upon Actaeon’s inadvertent invasion of her
privacy. One day under a warm midday sun when Actaeon, his companions, and his
hounds were hunting stag in the mountains, Actaeon announced to the others that their
hunting having already brought success enough for one day, they should take their rest.
Nearby in a small body of water fed by a stream, Diana, the huntress queen, too took her
rest as her nymphs, Crocale, Nephele, Hyale and the rest, attended to her bow, javelin,
quiver, clothese and sandals. Actaeon, having left his companions but having no purpose
to do so (led thither by his destiny”) encounters Diana, whose nymphs, screaming, rush to
cover her. Unable to locate her arrows to slay the intruder, Diana utters instead: “No go
and tell, if you can, that you have seen Diana unapparrelled.” At once stag horns began
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to grow from Actaeon’s head, and the rest of his body began to assume the form of a stag.
He fled, and although he admired his new speed, when he paused to see his reflection in
some water he wept in fear in shame. As he paused, Actaeon was seen by his hounds,
Malampus, a Spartan dog, together with Pamphagus, Dorceus, Lelaps, Theron, Nape,
Tigris and the others, w ho gave chase. Over cliffs and through gorges Actaeon fled until
his dogs closed in. He commanded them: “I am Actaeon; recognize your master.” But he
was unable to speak any human words, and was felled by his own hounds to the cheers of
his hunting companions.87
Further to the genre of African folk tales or myths, numerous stories address a
polycentric array of human strengths and foibles, and in so doing reveal norms and
cultural expectations very similar to those recognized in modern law throughout the
world. One Soninke legend, from the Sudan, entitled Gassire’s Lute, tells of a mythical
Wagadu, “not of stone, not of wood, not of earth[,]” but rather “the strength which lives
in the hearts of men[.]”88 Wagadu would disappear (or “sleep”), and with her that
strength in men’s hearths, when overwhelmed by man’s vanity, falsehood, greed, or
dissension, which is to say, four pillars of man’s “guilt”.89 Within one of many tales
centering upon Wagadu, she appears not as a mythical person but rather as a town. The
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forces of Wagadu are led by Wagana Sako, has gone to war against a rival group, led by
Mamadi Sefe Dekote. One night Mamadi Sefe Dekote secretly leaves the battle lines and
enters Wagadu, seeking an audience with Wagana Sako’s wife and another woman. On
the same night, Wagana Sako also leaves the lines and returns to see his wife. As he
approaches his hut, he sees and hears the following: As Mamadi Sefe Dekote addresses
Wagana Sako’s wife, the two of them witness a mouse running along a beam above them.
The mouse sees a cat below it, and is so frightened that it falls and is killed by the cat.
Mamadi Sefe Dekote says: “Just as the mouse fears the cat, so do we fear your husband.”
Hearing this, Wagana Sako knows he cannot confront his enemy, and he remounts his
horse and leaves, for its is considered “unchivalrous for a Soninke to challenge a man
who admitted that he was afraid.”90
Kabyl was a regionbordering the Mediterranean Sea in what is now Algeria. One
Kabyl folk tale, the Jackal and Farmer,91 tells a story of the risks of attempting to molest
one into giving up the just deserts of his labor.92 It is the story of a farmer who daily
plowed his land with two oxen. In a succession of days, as the farmer plows he is
confronted by a lion who states: “Give me one of your two oxen or I’ll kill you and both
of them.” For three or more encounters the farmer surrenders an ox, and proceeds to buy
another in order to continue his farming, but with the same result. One day, an observant
jackal engages the farmer in a conversation in which the farmer recites the dilemma of
which the jackal is already aware. The jackal tells the farmer that he will rid the farmer
of the lion upon the promise that the farmer will give the jackal a sheep, and the farmer
readily agreed. The jackal proposes to the farmer agree to a ruse whereby the lion,
90
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thinking that a disguised voice of the jackal is that of God, permits the farmer to strike
and kill it with a hatchet. Preparing to make good on his bargain with the jackal, the
farmer kills a ram and places it in a basket he takes to the fields. His wife suggests that it
is not the fairest of deals that the farmer has struck with the jackal, and the two agree to
also place in the basket the farmer’s hound. The following day, the basket is placed near
the field in which the farmer plows, and near the end of the day the jackal arrives to claim
his prize. It opens the basket not to find the ram alone, but rather the dog together with
the ram, and the dog chases the jackal away. Bringing home the basket and the ram, the
farmer declares to his wife: “The jackal has not called for his ram. Now we can eat it for
ourselves.”93
A complete survey of African myth would likely reveal that its agrarian cultures
thought as disparagingly of jackals as they might of hyenas. So it would seem, at least in
this, another folk tale from the Kabyl, titled The Jackal and the Lambs.94 In this story, a
grotto serves as the home of a ewe and her two lambs. At the end of a day of grazing, the
ewe returns to the home with hay for here lambs, and uses this password to signal to the
lambs that they may safely open the door: “The jug between the legs (the udder) and the
hay between the horns.” A jackal observes this, and tries to use the same password to
gain entrance, but the lambs, recognizing that his voice is not that of the ewe, refuse him
entrance. The jackal consults with a wise man, who tells him that to change his voice to
be as soft as the ewe’s, he must lie on an ant heap, and let the ants run in and out of his
mouth, permitting the ants to eat away enough of his throat to change his voice. The
jackal does so, and the following day his trick works, and he enters the grotto and
93
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devours the lambs. The ewe quickly detects the jackal’s paw in this matter, and when she
next sees him, she throws the bundle of hay between her horns at the jackal, burying him.
She then alerts the shepherd as to the jackal’s wrong, and that it can be found buried
beneath the hay, whereupon the shepherd takes his crook and beats the animal to death.95
If a central role of myth is to advance a cultural ideation that explains the external
world to its adherents, it follows that this explanation will provide that although one may
wish and behave in such a manner that fairness, justice, comfort and prosperity ought to
prevail, from time to time, or perhaps even as often as not, they will not. This, again, is
part and parcel of the rationalizing, mediating role of myth. An East African tale of Fire
and Water speaks of the “eternal struggle between truth and falsehood.”96 The tale
recounts Truth, Falsehood, Fire and Water journeying together, only to discover a herd of
cattle. They decide it will be just to divide the herd into equal shares, but this is not
enough for the greedy falsehood. He seeks to set his fellow travelers upon themselves,
first turning to Water and claiming that Fire intends to burn all nearby vegetation, driving
the cattle away, and advises Water to extinguish the fire right away. Water unwisely
heeds Falsehood’s counsel and he does so. The Falsehood approaches Truth and claims
that on the basis of what Water has done, he is not to be trusted, and that he and Truth
should flee with all of the cattle and head into the mountains. Truth is fooled, and agrees.
As Truth and Falshood take the cattle uphill, Water cannot follow. Atop the mountain,
Falsehood reveals his mendacity, claims Truth as his servant. Truth defies him and the
two fight to the accompaniment of thunder, but neither can destroy the other. The both
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call in Wind to decide the conflict, but Wind responds that it is not for him to do. In
language that conveys a clear normative preference for Truth, Wind states:
Truth and Falsehood are destined to struggle. Sometimes Truth will win but other
times Falsehood will win, and then Truth must rise up and fight again. Until the
end of the world. Truth must battle Falsehood, and must never rest or let down
his guard, or he will be finished once and for all.97
Another Dinka legend reveals with literary flair the mediating role myth can play
for a person or a people who must see some reason in their confrontation with hardship or
injustice. The Dinka rationalize injustice through the myth of the Departed Divinity. As
characterized by Clifford Geertz, in this less homiletic than descriptive account, the Sky,
wherein dwells the Divinity, and the earth, were once connected by a rope.98 There was o
death or suffering, and man and woman were able to subsist on a single grain of millet
each day. Eventually greed overtook the woman,99 and planted more than her aliquot
share, but in her haste, her hoe struck Divinity. Divinity thereafter severed the rope and
retreated to the sky, leaving man to the evil and injustice in which he suffers to this
day.100 As can be recognized, without the myth of the Departed Divinity, the Dinka
would be hard pressed to find any “moral coherence” in a world of suffering, injustice
and iniquity.101
Lest children be left out of the a cultural message that life can be harsh and unfair,
many folk songs and folk games include what might be described as truly appalling
results. As put by one scholar, many children’s games reveal “something of the stern,
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hard rules of society in an early day[.]”102 For example, in a Swiss version of the gamesong of “Judge and Jury”, a thief who has fled from capture is caught, and is brought
back to the king, who orders his execution by beheading.103 Another example is a
German game-song, carried out in verse and pantomime, a young girl104 would be sitting
on a stone in the center of the game, “combing her golden hair[.]” Her assailant would
approach undetected, until such time as she noticed him, and saw him to be her “wicked
brother”, Karl. As she begins to weep he pulls a make believe knife and stabs her, and
then flees. Some in the circle rush to her aid. Her good brother, Benjamin, then appears,
lifts her in his arms, and carries her from the circle.105 Several variations on this gamesong exist, but in none of them are the good brother, family members, or others able to
protect her or for that matter apprehend the villain.106

IV.

CONCLUSION
At a formal level, modern law enjoys many similarities with the myths of

antiquity. Indeed, Professors Goodrich and Hachamovitch suggest that the law is a
“presence which implies the totality of its history, but this implication is not logical or
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historical; rather it is traditional and mythic.” 107 Law has also been plausibly described
as magical, i.e., it represents a societal the effects of which are imposed magically,
through “a method of supporting endeavor to control the environment and social
relationships by means where the connection of effort with achievement cannot be
measured.”108 And so it is perhaps arbitrarily dichotomous to inquire as to the effect of
myth on primitive and modern justice, when myth and justice are so closely interrelated.
However it can be seen that myth and fable have performed a role that differs
from that played by religion, and it did so millennia before organized faith. In terms of
timing, myths and fables were adopted as socio-cultural interpretive means at times when
their appurtenant cultures were pre-theistic or pan-theistic. Myth and fable also served
the smaller and more insular constituencies of clans and tribes, while a more fully
developed society was the typical social predicate for organized faith.
Of greatest importance, myth and fable, unlike religion, have always enjoyed the
malleability that would permit it to change, if only incrementally, to respond to the new
externalities that might face a social group. If after untold years of fruitful existence in a
region of deciduous forests changes in climate made the availability of game less
predictable, then mythic figures were at the ready to mold themselves into forms with
personal traits that were displeased with the affected adherents. And if guiding cultural
tenets of honesty (or generosity, or other estimable characteristics) were sometimes put to
the test by the injustice or greed of others, myth or fable could render such unpredictable
results susceptible of rationalization, even if not agreeable.
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None of this is to suggest that myth and fable hold a monopoly on the social selfimage of any particular culture, or on the instruction as to behavior that should be or must
be. There is no doubt that religion’s sacred texts include copious behavioral instruction.
And yet myth cannot be displaced as a fundamental and inextirpatable source of social
history, and as such, an ongoing cultural influence throughout the world. Myth gave to
primitive and ancient man at least as much to hope as to fear, which is, after all, the
function of progressive modern justice systems.
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